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IDEOLOGY AND JUDGING IN
THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA*
By ROBERT MARTIN"

The purpose of this article is to advance some hypotheses about the way the
Supreme Court of Canada operates as a state institution. The analysis is based on
the period since 1948. The first hypothesis is that the judges of the Supreme Court
of Canada belong to the dominant class in Canadian society. The second hypothesis
is that they contribute to the dominance of their class primarily on the ideological
plane.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The state has been a central concern of Marxist analysis. It
has been assumed that the state acts, in some way or other, as one
means whereby the dominant class in a given society maintains its
dominance. Considerable effort has been devoted to explicating
more precisely the concrete ways in which different states at
different periods have done so. An exceedingly broad range of
hypotheses has been advanced.
The earliest was that of Engels. His approach was adapted
and made blunter by Lenin who saw the state as nothing more than
a weapon wielded by a dominant class.1 Lenin may have been right
about Tsarist Russia in 1916, but his view can have little application
in the advanced capitalist societies of the late 20th century. This
seems to have become generally recognised and, as a result,
theoreticians have tried either to supplement Lenin's formulation or
to add a degree of subtlety to it. 2
I will summarize my
understanding of the various qualifications and disclaimers.
First, the state enjoys what has come to be called "relative
autonomy." This means that the state does not invariably, or
necessarily ever, respond to direct commands from the dominant
class, but that it operates very much according to its own agenda.
Second, the state may have priorities and interests which do not at
any given moment correspond exactly to those of the dominant class.
This will be particularly the case when the dominant class is riven by
confusion or factionalism. Third, the state does more than simply
physically coerce its subjects. More important for the purposes of
this essay, it also plays a role in maintaining the primacy (or
hegemony) of a particular ideology, an ideology which tends to be
congruent with the interests of the dominant class.
Thus, the contemporary view of the state is that while its
actions do support the dominance of a particular class, this must be

1 The State and Revolution, 2nd ed. (New York: International Publishers, 1932, 1918).
2 Among such writers, one would want to especially note Antonio Gramsci, Ralph
Miliband, Nicos Poulantzas, and E.P. Thompson.
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seen as the expression of a tendency which is felt in the aggregate
and over time. It is, therefore, conceivable that particular actions of
the state may appear to contradict the immediate, ostensible
interests of the dominant class. The purpose of this essay is to
advance some hypotheses about the way the Supreme Court of
Canada operates as a state institution. The analysis is based on the
period since 1949.
The essay originates from the feeling of bewilderment which
grew in me over years of reading Supreme Court of Canada
decisions. The decisions made no sense. I kept puzzling over the
question of what the judges were doing or, more precisely, what
they thought they were doing. At its most basic, the essay is an
attempt to explain to myself the mysterious behaviour of Supreme
Court judges.
My first hypothesis is that the judges are members of the
dominant class in Canada. A few were born into that class; the
majority achieved membership in it. As Roy Romanow, former
Attorney-General of Saskatchewan, put it, "judges are inevitably
drawn from the most privileged ranks of our society."3 Implicit in
my hypothesis is the assumption that there are classes in Canada and
that there is a dominant class. I will assume that, contrary to the
common myth of "classlessness," the existence of classes in Canada
has been empirically established at least since John Porter published
The Vertical Mosaic.4

Others, such as Wallace Clement 5 have

simply confirmed Porter's observations.
Porter, interestingly, argued that the judges were members of
what he called the "political elite". As T.H. Marshall noted, this did
"raise(s) problems of analysis" for, "the power of a judge is quite
different in kind from the power of a minister or a president."6 If
3 "The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms" (Address to the Canadian
Bar
Association Annual Meeting, 1986) [unpublished].
4 John Porter, The Vertical Mosaic: An Analysis of Social Class and Power in Canada

(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1965).
5 The Canadian CorporateElite: An Analysis of Economic Power (Toronto: McClelland

and Stewart, 1985).
6 "Class and Power in Canada" (1965) 2 Can. Rev. Soc'y Anth. 215.
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judges are members of the dominant class, how do they play their
class role within the state apparatus?
My second hypothesis is that the judges of the Supreme
Court of Canada contribute to the dominance of their class primarily
on the ideological plane. I do not believe that it is necessary or
profitable here to rehearse the now considerable literature on the
ideological functions of law. My own views can be found in two
articles.7 The reader's attention is also directed to Alan Hunt's "The
Ideology of Law: Advances and Problems in Recent Applications of
the Concept of Ideology to the Analysis of Law,"s which provides a
lucid summary of the most significant writing.
For present purposes, ideology can be viewed as a collection
of beliefs, ideas, and values. These beliefs did not, however, arise
randomly or fortuitously. They are intimately connected with a
particular set of social and economic relations. The nature of the
connection is that the ideology tends to conduce towards the
maintenance of those social and economic relations. Ideology does
this by presenting the relations as both just and inevitable.
The legal system is not the only source of ideology in a
given society, nor is it necessarily the most important. But the legal
system does operate at the level of ideology by acting to confer
legitimacy on existing social and economic relations. It should be
added that the legal system has more than ideological functions.
The law also has substantive content and this content likewise
conduces towards maintaining the primacy of a particular class. To
be more concrete, the judges act to uphold the notion which is
essential to the ideological functions of the Canadian legal system equality before the law. This notion posits that all citizens are
equally subject to the law, that each citizen is, in the eyes of the
law, the equal of all others.
The ideological postulate of equality before the law is made
manifest in the courtroom through judicial neutrality. The judge is
indifferent as between plaintiff and defendant, appellant and

7"Notes on Legal Literature in East Africa" (1978) 10 Case vest. Res. J.Int'l. L. 123;
"Ideological Functions of Legal Literature in East Africa" in W. Twining & J.Uglow, eds,
Legal Literature in Small Jurisdictions(London: Commonwealth Secretariat, 1981) at 69.
8 (1985) 19 Law & Soc'y Rev. 11.
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respondent. The judge is merely there to apply the law. And,
indeed, the law itself is defined as neutral, as giving preference to
neither side; nor, more important, as favouring any broader social
interest or class. It should be obvious that the law is not, in an
objective social sense, neutral, but I am dealing here purely at the
level of ideology. Maintaining the appearance of neutrality is,
indeed, the prime ideological function of the legal system. For, as
E.P. Thompson put it, "if the law is evidently partial and unjust, it
will mask nothing,
legitimize nothing, contribute nothing to any
9
hegemony."
class's
The judges of the Supreme Court of Canada play out their
ideological roles in the courtroom by giving judgments which are
couched in purely legal terms and which, therefore, give the
appearance of social and political neutrality. Outside the courtroom
the judges strive to reinforce the notion of judicial neutrality.
The state maintains its legitimacy, in part then, through the
notion that the law is neutral. There may be a system of class
domination in civil society, indeed that class domination is objectively
manifested in the substantive content of the law, but the legal
system must reveal itself, and be perceived, as neutral. The legal
system cannot discharge its other class responsibilities unless it
maintains the appearance of its own neutrality.
It is not necessary that the judges fully grasp their own role
in the state system. The judges do, in fact, as I will suggest below,
have ideological preconceptions about their own ideological
functions. Put another way, the judges are not acting dishonestly in
maintaining he notion of neutrality. They are both the subjects and
the objects of the dominant ideology and are as much affected by it
as ordinary citizens. It is, therefore, wrong to imagine that the
judges of the Supreme Court of Canada are appointed on the basis
of their willingness to give effect to the day to day requirements of
the dominant class. The role they play is far more subtle and,
therefore, more successful.
Equally, it would be a serious distortion to see the judges as
little more than puppets. While it is true that political patronage
has generally been central in making judicial appointments since well

Wzigs and Hunters: The Origin of the Black Act (London: Allan Lane, 1975) at 26.
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before Confederation, direct patronage has not been a factor in
Supreme Court of Canada appointments in recent years. D.D.
Abbott in 1954 appears to have been the last patronage
appointment. Abbott went straight from the federal cabinet to the
court. Still, one must not go too far in the other direction and
imagine that the political inclinations of prospective appointees are
irrelevant. Joe Clark, during his short-lived tenure as Prime
Minister in 1979, made only one appointment to the Supreme Court
of Canada - Julien Chouinard. Clark had attempted, without
success, to get Chouinard into his cabinet. Chouinard was also
known publicly as someone inclined towards the political right. At
a more general level, the obvious similarity between the views of
Bora Laskin and Pierre Trudeau about the Canadian constitution
must have been a factor in Laskin's appointment as Chief Justice in
1973.!0 Still, it should be evident from the confusing multiplicity of
both majority and dissenting opinions produced by the Court that
the judges enjoy considerable individual autonomy in carrying out
their roles.
This essay has two parts. It begins with an analysis of
precisely who, in social terms, the judges have been. None of them
descended, gowned in ermine and scarlet, from heaven. Each was
the product of a specific process of socialisation. This was a process
which saw the judges ideologically incorporated within the dominant
class. It also equipped the judges with the peculiar ideological
preconceptions of Canadian lawyers.
The next part looks directly at ideology. We start with
writing by, and about, the judges. To be more precise, I look at
statements by judges, whether in the form of published speeches or
in books or articles, where the judges discuss their views on
Canadian society and the issues which move it. Then we look at
material, in both popular and professional publications, which is
devoted to the same general subject. The striking thing is how little
of such material there is. Possible explanations for this will be

10 On this general question, see Canadian Bar Association, Comnnittee on theAppointnmnt
of Judges in Canada (Ottawa, 1985) esp. at 57; James G. Snell & Frederick Vaughan, The

Supreme Court of Canada:History of the Institution (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
1985) at 199-200, 235; Martin "An Open Legal System" (1985) 23 U.W.O.L. Rev. 169 at 18386.
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examined. Finally, we turn to reported judgments of the Supreme
Court of Canada with a view, once again, to discovering what these
reveal about the ideology of judging. This raises some difficult
methodological questions which stem largely from the ideological
notion of judicial neutrality itself. The methodological problems will
be discussed more fully below. I conclude with some observations
about the Canadian Chater of Rights and Freedoms.
A word of warning. My research has unearthed few
surprises. This should not be surprising. The Canadian judiciary has
been an exceedingly homogenous group. That is, the judges have
been mostly middle-aged to elderly, white, males who were successful
lawyer-politicians. And it should, I hope, astound no one to
discover that their views on social issues have been pretty well the
views that anyone with knowledge of Canadian society would expect
such a group to hold.
II. THE JUDGES11
My hypothesis that the judges are members of the dominant
class must, at bottom, remain a hypothesis. I cannot prove
empirically that they belong to that class. This is in large measure
a function of the concept "class" itself. Class is not, as E.P.
12
Thompson has made clear, a thing; it is a process, an experience.
What I can demonstrate is that the judges have been through the
dominant class's process of education and political and professional
socialisation.
The first thing to not about the 30 people who have sat on
the Court since 1949 is that 28 of them have been men. And even
with the first woman to become a member of the Court, the
homogeneity that is the overriding characteristic of this group asserts
itself. Bertha Wilson, prior to her appointment to the Ontario court

Most of the material which follows is drawn from standard reference sources.
Where

other sources have been used, this is indicated.
12 See E.P. Thompson, The Making of the English Working Class (Harmondsworth:

Penguin, 1968) at 9-15.
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of Appeal in 1975, was a partner, albeit the first female partner, in
the prestigious Toronto firm of Osler, Hoskin and Harcourt.
Only four of the judges went to private schools. It was in
their higher education that the judges received their most intensive
class socialisation. Four were Rhodes Scholars. Two more went to
Oxford without Rhodes Scholarships. Curiously, none of the judges
attended Cambridge. Five attended Harvard Law School. Only one,
Locke, received no institutional legal education at all.
Eleven of the judges played an active part in politics. The
activity ranged from being a federal minister (Abbott), through being
an advisor to the Prime Minister of Canada (Beetz and La Forest),
to holding office as a provincial Attorney-General (J.W. Estey and
Rand), to be elected to a provincial legislature, or being a defeated
candidate, and finally to merely being publicly identified with a party.
It is noteworthy that no one who had been identified with the
C.C.F. or the N.D.P. has been appointed to the Supreme Court of
Canada. Indeed, when Hall was a Conservative candidate in the
1948 Saskatchewan election, he suggested that T.C. Douglas was a
13
"National Socialist."
What is striking is the number of judges who were, at one
time or another in their careers, involved in teaching law. Sixteen
of the judges taught, although only eight were full-time teachers.
Bora Laskin is undoubtedly the best known in this group, but
several deans of university law schools are also included. Pratte,
Beetz, Le Dain, and La Forest were deans before being appointed
to the Court; Rand became a dean after his retirement; and Fauteux
was a dean while still sitting on the Court.
Nine of the judges served in the military. In most cases, this
was real military service. Three of the judges (Cartwright, Locke,
and Nolan) were awarded the Military Cross, while Dickson was
seriously wounded in action.
Only one judge managed to become a professional athlete.
Sopinka played with the Toronto Argonauts and the Montreal
Allouettes. About a third of the judges could be described as
coming from haute-bourgeois backgrounds. A handful (Laskin and

13 Dennis Gruending, Emmett Hall: Establishmcnt Radical (Toronto: Macmillan of
Canada, 1985) at 65.
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Wilson, at least) rose from humble circumstances. The rest appear
to have had comfortable, if less than grand, petit-bourgeois origins.
But nearly all had noteworthy careers in academe, politics, or with
prestigious law firms. The exceptions are Judson, Kellock, and
Kerwin, who, so far as I can discern, had unmemorable careers prior
to their translations to Ottawa. Most of the judges joined the
Rideau Club on coming to Ottawa, although this has not been so
true in recent years.
Two exceptions might be taken to the notion that the judges
have been socialized into the dominant class. Both are based in an
approach which defines membership in that class solely in economic
terms. First, it could be said that, because of conventions which
require judges, on appointment, to divest themselves of direct
corporate investments, the judges do not partake in the ownership
of the means of production and do not, therefore, belong to the
dominant class. While owners of the means of production are
clearly charter members of the dominant class, they are definitely
not the only persons who undergo the processes that form the class.
Second, it might be argued that wealthy lawyers in private practice
make incomparably more than Supreme Court of Canada judges and
this disqualifies judges from membership in the dominant class. This
argument must be rejected on the methodological ground already
noted and, to some extent, on empirical grounds. Many of the
judges were once wealthy lawyers in private practice. They are paid
$151,700.00 per year (The Chief Justice gets $163,800.00). This is
not a bad salary, particularly when one remembers that it is
guaranteed until age 75, that the pension is excellent, and the
working conditions and perks are good.1 4 And, to repeat, it is a

distortion of the reality of class to seek to establish economic
criteria as the only indicia of class membership.
I will end this section by returning to the point about the
homogeneity which the group exhibits. Two women, one Jew. All
white. All, except for Laskin, either French or from one of the
tribes of the British Isles. Even if one is not comfortable with class

14 See Judges Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. J-1, as am. S.C. 1987, c. 47, s. 1. These salaries are
effective 1 April 1988.
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analysis, this is not a group of people which is socially, culturally, or
ethnically representative of Canadians.
III. IDEOLOGY
A. Writing and Public Statements By and About Judges
1. By Judges
Here one encounters tremendous variations both in quality
and in volume. Four judges wrote a great deal. All were, for
periods of their lives, legal academics. Laskin produced vastly more
than any other judge, with Le Dain, Pigeon, and La Forest coming
far behind.
The bulk of this writing by Supreme Court of Canada judges
consists of exposition and analysis of technical legal issues. While it
confines itself to doctrinal questions and is positivistic in approach
and pedestrian in style, the same could be said for most Canadian
legal writing. One can infer certain things from such writing. Its
authors tend to accept the existing legal and social arrangements and
to be disinclined towards critical reflection about the law or legal
institutions. One could also make this observation about Canadian
legal writing generally, and while it may tell us that the judges are
in the mainstream of the Canadian legal culture, it does not assist
us greatly in penetrating their particular social thinking. The rest of
the writing by the judges could charitably be consigned to the genre
of the after-dinner speech.
There is little writing in which the judges provide insights
into their social thinking. Where such insights are to be found, they
contain about what one would expect. Rinfret observed in 195615
that religions are just different ways to "worship ... the same

Supreme Being". Dickson in 1967,16 Cartwright in 1968,17 Hall in

15 "Reminiscences from the Supreme Court of Canada" (1956) 3 McGill LJ. 1 at 4.
16 "Address , (1967) 36 Man. Bar News 99.
17 "An Address to Convocation" (1968)- 2 Law Soc'y Gaz. 2.
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1975,18 and Laskin in 1977,19 all came out against disrespect for the

law. Rand spoke in 195420 about the methods Canada used to
ensure "loyalty" and to keep vital secrets from disloyal people. He
did this in an address titled "Man's Right to Knowledge and Its Free
Use." Discussing the Civil Code of Quebec in 1952,21 Fauteux said
that amongst its "'cardinal principles' were untrammelled freedom of
dominion over the things one owns." At a grander level, Beetz
opined in 197222 that "justice consists in giving everyone his due,"
while a year earlier Hall 23 observed that "the courts and the
legislature are pursuing the same ultimate goal - the common good
of the people". De Grandpre 24 attacked state-controlled legal aid
schemes because they undermined the autonomy of the legal
profession. If the legal profession gave up its autonomy, he
believed, the public would lose confidence in the administration of
justice. Rather more vigorous views were expressed by J.W. Estey
and Chouinard. In 1940, as Attorney-General of Saskatchewan,
Estey delivered a spirited attack on socialism. 25 In 1950, he stressed
the role of the Church in preserving the Charter of the United
Nations.2 6 Chouinard, the senior advisor to Robert Bourassa during
October 1970, and the first Progressive Conservative appointee since
the Diefenbaker era, ran as a strong "law and order" candidate in

18 "Freedom under the Law" (1975) 9 Law Soe'y. Gaz. 102.

19 "Public Perceptions of the Supreme Court of Canada" (Canadian Press Annual Dinner,
Toronto, 20 April 1977).
20 (1954) 10 U.T.LJ. 167.
21 "he Civil Code of Quebec" (1952) 1 U.B.C.L. Rev. 215.
22 "Reflections in Continuity and Change in Law Reform" (1972) 22 U.T.L.J. 129 at 140.
23 "Law Reform and the Judiciary's Role" (1972) 10 Osgoode Hall LJ.399 at 406.
24 "Bar Association Head Attacks Government-run Legal Aid" The Globe and Mail (11

June 1973) 8.
25 Regina Leader-Post (7 March 1941).
26 "Role of Church in U.N. Stressed" The Globe and Mail (25 July 1950) 11.
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the federal election of 1968. He denounced the National Parole
Board for
leniency and claimed that the law was "soft" on
27
criminals.
Heterodox public statements have been rare. In the 1967,28
speech referred to, Dickson said that the then fashionable challenge
to authority was "not necessarily to be deplored." And he
admonished the profession "to ensure that their concepts and
practices and conduct stand the test of critical and continued
scrutiny." On a less grand plan, W.Z. Estey29, noted in 1981 that
appeals were costly and that they could be a "weapon of tyranny in
the hands of the economically stronger litigant." In the 1950's,
Pigeon, 30 long before he became a judge, called for the reform of
labour laws and spoke in favour of the right to strike. Hall and
Lamer have been the two most unusual members of the court. Hall
was the Chair of the Royal Commission on Health Services which,
in 1964, recommended the creation of a national system of health
care. Indeed, his recommendations went beyond what was politically
feasible at the time. And, although he was still a member of the
Court, he publicly campaigned in favour of his Report when it ran
into political difficulties. 31 In 1968, the Ontario Committee on the
Aims and Objectives for Education, of which he was Co-Chair, made
its report. 32 The Report was a blueprint for a root and branch reordering of education in Ontario. In 1971 Hall made a public
speech in which he argued that a decent standard of living should
be a legal right. He further suggested that Canada's freedoms were

27 Richard Cleroux, "Quiet Conservative, Chouinard, Joins Supreme Court Today" The
Globe and Mail (5 October 1979) at 10.
28 Supra, note 16.
29 "Who Needs Courts?" (1981) 1 Windsor Y.B. Access Just. 263 at 278.
30 The Globe and Mail (9 May 1957).

31 "Our Gentle Judge in the Supreme Court is a Man Who Cares" Toronto Star (1 July
1972); Gruending, supra, note 13 at 97.
32 Ontario, Provincial Committee on the Aims and Objectives of Education in the
Schools of Ontario, Living and Learning (Toronto: Newton Pub. Co. Ltd., Ontario, 1968).
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of little value to people without jobs.3 3 Lamer is rather less
remarkable. Still, he was Chair of the Law Reform Commission of
Canada between 1975 and 1978, a period when the Commission was
being aggressively "liberal."34 In 1976 he spoke of the need to
''3
protect "the little guy. s
To the extent that they have addressed the question, the
judges have denied that their perspectives on social issues affect the
way they discharge their judicial duties. Laskin was most vehement
in this respect. In 1978 he took issue with widespread public
criticism of the court's decisions in the CIGOL3 6 and Central
Canada Potash37 cases. The view had been expressed in many
quarters that these decisions demonstrated a centralist bias in the
Supreme Court of Canada. He described this view as "reckless in its
implication that we have considerable freedom to give voice to our
personal predilections, and thus to political preferences." He
denounced the suggestion that the judges might represent certain
social interests "I know of no better way to subvert our judicial
38
system."
In 1982, Laskin carried this point a step further and seemed
to demand that Canadian judges behave as if they had no opinions
at all on social issues. As a result of critical comments he had made
about the Government of Canada's proposals for the "patriation" of
the Canadian constitution, Mr. Justice Thomas Berger of the British
Columbia Supreme Court was investigated by the Canadian Judicial
Council.
The Council decided that Berger's behaviour was
Supra, note 31.
34 Montreal Gazette (29 March 1980). See also, Monopoli, "Lamer Brings Reform-Minded
Record to Supreme Court" FinancialPost (26 April 1980) 3.
35 The Globe and Mail (4 March 1976) 4.
36 CanadianIndustrialGas and Oil Ltd v. Government of Saskatchewan, [1978] 2 S.C.R.

545.
37

Central CanadianPotash Co. Ltd and The Attorney General Of Canadav. Government
of Saskatchewan, [1979] 1 S.C.R. 42.
38 "Judicial Integrity and the Supreme Court of Canada" (1978) 12 Law Soc'y Gaz. 116

at 121.
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"indiscreet", but not so heinous as to support a recommendation that
he be removed from office. This does not seem to have satisfied
Laskin. In September of 1982 he made a public speech in which he
said, "a judge who feels so strongly on political issues that he must
speak out is best advised to resign from the bench."39 Three months
later Berger decided to resign.40 In his letter of resignation Berger
made reference to Laskin's public criticism of him.
An obituary written after Laskin's death made the point that
Laskin took the stand he did because of his belief that "public
respect for the law required great public confidence in the
impartiality of the judiciary."41 Interestingly enough, Hall, by then
retired, contacted Berger during the period he was under
investigation and offered to make a public statement on his behalf.42
The issue arose again in 1986. Dickson delivered a speech
at the University of British Columbia on the theme, "The
He made some unremarkable
Importance of Universities".
observations about universities and then went on to criticise both
the Government of Canada and provincial governments for failing to
fund universities adequately. He observed: "Please do not choke off
the funding of universities" and "education is too important to be
left to ministers of finance."43 The Globe and Mail was not amused.
An editorial suggested that by letting the world know they had
opinions on "political" matters, the judges might undermine the
perception that they were impartial. The editorial seemed to regard

Canadian Bar Association, Annual Meeting, Toronto, 4 September 1982.
40 See Martin, "Should Judges Speak Out? The Cases of Berger and Monnin" Ontario

Lawyers Weekly (23 September 1983); and Felsk-y, "The Berger Affair and The Independence
of the Judiciary" (1984) 42 U.T. Fac. L. Rev. 118.
41 Jeff Sallot, 'The Legacy of Laskin: A Court for a New Era" The Globe and Mail (28
March 1984) 3. See also Laskin's speech, "Some Observations on Judicial Independence"
(1980) 4 Prov. Judges J. No. 4 at 17.
42 Gruending, supra, note 13 at 180.
43 Brian Dickson, C.J.C., "Congregation Address Delivered by the Right Honourable

Brian Dickson at the University of British Columbia, 30 May 1986" (Convocation, University
of British Columbia, 30 May 1986) [unpublished].
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Laskin's earlier expression of his personal opinion about 44public
utterances by judges as a formal canon of judicial behaviour.
Even as apparently consistent a judge as Martland stated in
an interview given after his retirement that he had never consciously
developed a judicial philosophy. He did, however, accept that such
a philosophy was bound to develop implicitly and that it would be
affected by the individual judge's background. 45
Sopinka expressed the traditional view on his appointment in
1988: "I don't think I'll decide cases on the basis of my46 own
personal predilections - at least that's what I'll strive to do."
Wilson has conceded, in a departure from the established
tradition, that there may be factors other than the law which enter
into judicial decision-making. She wrote:
All judges would like to think that their decisions, as well as constituting a proper
application of legal principles, reflect current notions of what is right and fair. The

difficulty,
however, is to determine what current notions of justice and fairness
7
are.

4

She did not admit, of course, that the judge's personal opinions or
values might enter into a decision and refers instead to "current
notions." This is itself an ideological formulation since it denies
''current notions" any social context.
As a corollary to the notion that their values and attitudes
do not directly obtrude into their judging, the judges appear to
believe their role in the creation of law is limited. They reluctantly
admit that they do change the law, but argue that they do so only
on the margin and in an incremental fashion. "The law must be
certain", said Hall.48 Pigeon believed that courts do not make

44 "A Judge Speaks Out" The Globe and Mail (3 June 1986) 6.
45 Monopoli, "View from Inside the Supreme Court of Canada" FinancialPost (27 March
1982) 17.

46 Schmitz, "Prime Minister Appoints Lawyer to S.C.C." The Lawyers Weekly (3 June
1988).
47 Wilson, "Decision-Making in the Supreme Court" (1986) 36 U.T.L.J. 227.
48 Supra, note 23 at 406.
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policy;49 Dickson argued 'judges do make law, but ... their law'5 0
making power is a limited one.
2. Writing about Judges
Professional and academic writing about the Supreme Court
of Canada tends, like the writing of the judges themselves, to be
devoted to doctrinal questions. The most critical writing has been
directed at those decisions in which the court favoured police
powers at the expense of the rights of citizens. But little attempt
has been made to analyze the work of the Court in terms of the
class background and class orientation of its members. The norm
seems to be simply to rehearse the doctrinal criticism that a given
decision is "wrong" (or "right").
A recent monograph by James G. Snell & Frederick
Vaughan, The Supreme Court of Canada:History of the Institution,51
is very much in this disappointing tradition. The book is long on
information and short on analysis. The authors have a penchant for
making valid observations like "Wilson had an incisive legal mind"5 2
or "a basic deep-seated judicial conservatism remains. '" 3
An
interesting exception is a 1951 piece by John Willis in which he
suggested that the result reached in one case owed more to the
judges' attachment to the maintenance of a capitalist economy than
to legal doctrine 5 4
Such journalistic writing as exists about the judges of the
Supreme Court of Canada offers little assistance. This is, in part,
because reporters, who are properly cynical and disrespectful towards
politicians and athletes, turn to jelly in the presence of judges. It is

49 Monopoli, "View from the Supreme Court" FinancialPost (22 March 1980) 25.

50 "The Judiciary: Law Interpreters or Law-Makers" (1982) 12 Man. L.J. 1 at 7.
51 Supra, note 10.
52 Ibid at 236.
53 Ibid. at 241.
54 "Case Comment" (1951) 29 Can. Bar Rev. 296.
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equally so because judges, on those few occasions when they have
consented to talk to reporters, have not been forthcoming.
Canadian judges refuse, in particular, to talk to journalists about
judgments, dismissing questions with the grand observation that "the
judgment speaks for itself." Journalists seem appropriately reluctant
to rejoin that if a judgment really did speak for itself, there would
be no need to raise questions about it.
As a result, the popular writing is very superficial. It usually
amounts to dividing judges into "liberals" and "conservatives" or
"activists" and "non-activists," with the odd bit of lawyer gossip
thrown in for background. A recent biography of Hall described
him as "an unrepentant liberal on a generally conservative court".S
Barbara Amiel provided the readers of Maclean's with profound
insights into the inner workings of the Court, such as revealing that
Laskin, Spence, and Dickson tended to be activists.56 Or another
writer could make the meaningless statement that Dickson was "a
key swing vote."57 A Globe and Mail editorial commenting on
Dickson's appointment as Chief Justice remarked that he was "less
inclined than [Laskin] to strike down bad laws."58 In 1986, a wellinformed observer was able to opine in a similar vein that the Court
was splitting into "progressive" and "conservative" wings.5 9 Most
recently, press reports on the appointment of L'Heureux-Dube
described her as "aggressive."60

55 Gruending, supra, note 13 at 131.

56 "Nine Men in Search of Even-Handed Justice" Maclean's (12 February 1979).
57 John Hendrick, "A New Tough Role Faces Supreme Court" Toronto Star (26

December 1980) 7.
58 "Judge Dickson's Day" Globe and Mail (20 April 1984) 3.
59 Calami, 'The 'Dickson' Court's First Year" Ottawa Citizen (4 August 1986).
60 'Top Court Not First Challenge" The London Free Press (5 May 1987).
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3. Some Observations
Three conclusions suggest themselves in this section. First,
to state the obvious, the judges have beliefs, ideas and values.
Second, it is not easy to discern precisely what those are. Third, the
judges do not believe that their ideas determine or influence the
way they deal with cases. They prefer to believe that the results in
particular cases are determined by the application of legal principles.
Now to anyone with the slightest acquaintance with
psychology, or epistemology, or sociology, or history, this is hard to
accept. But it is made easier if one realises that the premises
outlined above are an accurate description of the dominant
Canadian ideology about judging. The judges, in my opinion, are
not lying. They really believe the ideology about themselves.
There is an interesting parallel with journalists. The essence
of the dominant ideology amongst journalists is the notion of
objectivity. Journalists believe passionately that they can be, and are
in fact, objective when covering stories. Judges can, like Thomas
Berger, be sanctioned for threatening the notion of neutrality by
revealing that they have ideas. Journalists, likewise, can be punished
for undermining the perception of their own objectivity 61when they
take public positions on matters of political controversy.
Let me offer two illustrations of the judges' commitment to
the judicial ideology. In 1981, Dickson addressed a meeting of the
Manitoba Bar Association. The title of his address was "The
Judiciary: Law Interpreters or Law-Makers." In attempting to define
the limits of judicial law-making he quoted from one of his own
judgments:
The duty of the court, as I envisage it, is to proceed in the discharge of its

adjudicative function in a reasoned way from principled decisions and established
concepts. I do not for a moment doubt the power of the court to act creatively it has done so on countless occasions;
but manifestly one must ask - what are the
62
limits of the judicial function.

61 See MacFarlane & Martin, "Political Activity and the Journalist: A Paradox" (1984)
10 Can. J. Comm. 1.
62 Supra, note 49 at 1.
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Fine. What does all this mean concretely? The case in
question was Hanison v. Carswell.63 It involved a determination of
the ambit of the authority of the proprietor of a shopping-mall over
persons - in this case, striking workers - using the mall. The
Supreme Court was being asked to rule that, consistent with the
approach adopted in the U.S., while a shopping-mall was, as a
matter of strict form, private property, it could be regarded, for
certain purposes, as public space. To rule in this manner, the Court
would have had to engage in some law-making. But Dickson, who
is, and we have it on the authority of Barbara Amiel,64 an activist,
refused to do so. Why?
Well, the shopping-mall in question was located in Winnipeg.
And, prior to his initial appointment to the bench in Manitoba,
Brian Dickson had practised law in Winnipeg. He made his
reputation in the corporate and commercial area and had often
acted as lawyer for real estate developers. Now, I do not wish for
an instant to suggest that Dickson was directly influenced in his
decision in Hanison. But is it not conceivable that his years of
representing real estate developers might have, implicitly but
implacably, predisposed Dickson to view the facts in Hal7ison in a
certain light? One might, similarly, question whether Laskin's
extensive experience in the labour relations field before becoming a
judge did not predispose him towards his dissenting conclusions in
Harison.63
I am sure that Dickson (and most Canadian judges) would
regard the suggestion I have just made as outrageous (if not
contemptuous). But it strikes me that to anyone who was not a
Canadian lawyer my analysis would appear trite and obvious.
The traditional view has been expressed by Wilson. Her
explanation of the case is that,

63 [1976] 2 S.C.R. 200.

64 Supra, note 55.
65 In one of their few attempts at analysis, Snell and Vaughan observe that Cartwright's
experience as a defence counsel and Fauteux's experience as a prosecutor may have affected
the way in which each approached criminal cases. Supra, note 10 at 208.
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these two sets of reasons ...
demonstrate how very eminent judges can hold differing
views on the proper scope of judicial law-making power. Which one the judge
prefers will
probably depend on the view he or she takes of the doctrine of
66
precedent.

The case is, as a result, stripped of all social content.
The second illustration has to do with L'Heureux-Dube, the
Court's junior judge. When her appointment was announced,
L'Heureux-Dube said to a reporter, "I can tell you I'm for justice.
Whether it be left, right, or centre, that all that counts." Here, of
course, she has distilled the essence of the ideological role of the
law, and of judges, in Canada. There may be politics, and politics
may respond to social divisions, but the law and "justice" are apart
from, and above, anything so sordid. The law, again, is neutral.
Dickson realised how clearly L'Heureux-Dube had understood her
job on the court. At her swearing in he observed, "In my opinion
this is a worthy statement of the ultimate, perhaps the only, role for
67
the Supreme Court of Canada."
Supreme Court of Canada judges live in a highly ideological
world. They believe things about themselves and their work which
are intellectually doubtful and which ordinary mortals would regard
as astounding. Nonetheless, these are things which the judges
actually and honestly believe. As Mr. Justice Robins of the
Supreme Court of Ontario recently put it, "A judge must rise above
his own prejudice,
his own preoccupations, and his own
6
predilections."
It might be argued that, since this belief on the part of the
judges is so clearly implausible, one should devise means of
discerning what they actually do think about the way they make
decisions. Some work has been done in this direction in the United
States and the U.K But there are serious problems with it. First,
I believe the U.S. work is methodologically suspect and, as a result,
yields insights which should have been self-evident. To take but one
66 Supra, note 46 at 233.
67 Supra, note 59.
68 S.L. Robins, MThe Role of an Independent Judiciary" (Special Lectures of the Law
Society of Upper Canada, 1979) 23 at 27.
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example, it leads to such revealing conclusions as "liberal" judges are
69
more lenient in sentencing criminals than "conservative" judges.
Second, the work that has been done in the U.K. 70 is concerned
primarily with judicial administration rather than with the intellectual
processes that lead judges to particular results. Finally, I have little
doubt that Canadian judges would simply refuse to take part in any
such study.71
It is in the context of this ideological perception about
judging that Laskin's vehement reaction to Mr. Justice Berger's
statements about the 1981 package of constitutional reforms
becomes more intelligible. To repeat, Berger's sin was to reveal that
judges actually did have opinions. Given the prevailing ideology
about judicial neutrality, this was a profound subversive act on
Berger's part. And as the chief guardian of the Canadian judiciary,
Laskin took appropriate action.
B. Judgments
I will begin this part by outlining the methodological
difficulties that were encountered.
The basic difficulty is one alluded to in the preceding
section. If there is one consistent thread in the judges' perception
of their own social predilections it is that these in no way affect the
way they approach actual cases. Let me put it another way. To the
extent that the notions of Supreme Court of Canada judges about
law and, more precisely, about judging can be discovered, these
notions can be summarised as unvarnished, classical positivism. The
judges appear to believe that all they do is apply the relevant law to
the facts and, thereby, reach a result. The idea that each judge
might through education, a professional career, political activity through a lifelong process of socialisation - have acquired attitudes,
69 Gibson, "Judges' Role Orientations, Attitudes and Decisions: An Interactive Model"
(1978) 72 A. Pol. Sci. Rev. 911 at 915.

70 See Alan Paterson, The Law Lords (London: MacMillan, 1982).
71 In fact, when one of my students requested permission in 1984 to interview judges of
a superior court, the request was denied.
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perceptions, priorities, prejudices and that these might profoundly
shape that individual's behaviour, and especially his judging, is not
only rejected, but is regarded as subversive. 72
This is the methodological problem. Since, in writing their
judgments, the judges do not state the social objectives which they
are seeking to further, and indeed expressly deny the existence of
any such objectives, what useful and scientifically valid information
Let me offer two
can be extracted from their judgments?
Court of Canada
Supreme
the
illustrations of the problem. First,
73
has rendered two decisions - R. v. Morgentaler and Minister of
Justice v. Borowski74 which concerned abortion. I assume, because
I cannot imagine otherwise, that the judges who took part in hearing
these appeals had personal beliefs about the desirability or otherwise
of abortion. Yet in neither of these decisions do the judges express
opinions about abortion itself.
For our second illustration we must cross the Atlantic. Lord
Denning's judgments have been regarded as fine legal literature. In
none of them does he make express statements that could lead one
to conclude he was a racist. Yet, certain passages apparently in the
first printing of his book What Nest in the Law? suggested to some
that he was. 75 We may not like the obfuscating style in which
judgments are written, but it works.
One could rely heavily on inference. But, in so doing, one
would merely be reading one's own beliefs back into the judgments.
For example, it could be said, as many have, that Rand was a
champion of democratic rights. From a different perspective,
however, one could read the decision in Winner v. S.MT. (Eastern)
Ltd.76 and say equally well that he was simply a strong supporter of
72 1am not, here, simply trying to repeat the insights of realist jurisprudence. Thc realists
demonstrated the serious failings of positivist jurisprudence, but they neglected to explore the
social significance of their own insights.
73 [1976] 1 S.C.R. 616.
74 [1981] 2 S.C.R. 575.
75 See Gibb, "Denning Jury Reforms Anger Black Lawyers" The Times (22 May 1982).
76 [1951] S.C.R. 887.
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a "free market" economy. One might also look at the series of civil
liberties cases from Quebec in the 1950s 77 and conclude that Rand
was merely expressing hostility towards Quebecois nationalism.
One could read the judgment in Switzman v. Elbling and
A.G. Quebec78 and say that Taschereau was anti-Communist, but this
is an observation which, I am confident, could be made about every
one of the judges.
One might begin with the presumption that the Supreme
Court of Canada would exhibit an anti-working class bias. Such a
bias could be inferred from a handful of cases. 79 But again one
would have to rely far too heavily on inference. More important,
the number of cases involving working class litigants which actually
gets to the Supreme Court is so small as to render any conclusions
open to doubt.
The journalistic dichotomies between "liberals" and
"conservatives" or "activists" and "non-activists" are revealed, on
closer inspection of the cases, to be unhelpful. Ritchie is generally
regarded as "conservative." Yet when it comes to questions
involving Aboriginal peoples, as in R. v. Diybones,80 Athabasca Tibal
Council v. Amoco Canada,81 and Four B Manufacturing Ltd v.
United Central Gannent Workers,82 he has been positively "liberal."
Similarly, Laskin, the darling of proponents of "activism," was
anything but activist in Reference re Anti-Inflation Act,83 Seneca

77

Boucher v. The King, [1951] S.C.R. 265; Saumnur v. The City of Quebec, [1953] 2 S.C.R.
299; Switnan v. Elbling and A.G. Quebec, [1957] S.C.R. 285; Roncarelli v. Duplessis, [1959]
S.C.R. 121.
78 Supra, note 76.
79
Harrisonv. Carswell, supra, note 62; Volvo CanadaLimited v. U.A. W. (1979), 99 D.L.R.
(3d) 193; McLoughlin v. Kutasy (1979), 26 N.R. 242.

80 [1970] S.C.R. 282.
81 [1981] 1 S.C.R. 699.
82 [1980] 1 S.C.R. 1031.
83 [1976] S.C.R. 373.
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College of Applied Arts and Technology v. Bhadauria,8 4 Gay Alliance
v. Vancouver Sun,85 Cherneskey v. Annadale Publishers Ltd.,86 and
Borowski.s7 Conversely, one can point to few judgments which are
more "activist" in their implications than the dissenting views of
Martland and Ritchie in the PatriationReference.88
I am not criticising particular judges for being "conservative"
(or "liberal") or "activist" (or "non-activist"). I am saying that these
89
adjectives are of no analytical value and dangerously misleading.
My point is that the usual methods of categorising judgments
tell us little, if anything, about the way judges think. Still, absent
express statements from the judges themselves, inference becomes
the researcher's only tool. In my considered opinion, there are two
kinds of cases from which one can make legitimate inferences about
the social thought of Supreme Court of Canada judges. These are,
first, cases that raise questions about the place of women in
Canadian society, and, secondly, cases where the Court has had to
make a choice between the rights of individuals and the powers of
the police. These cases suggest two conclusions. First, and more
important for this essay, judges, however much they may deny it, do
have opinions on social issues and these opinions are a factor in the
way they decide cases. Secondly, the opinions of the judges tend to
favour the maintenance of existing social relationships and practices.
Finally, I think that the style in which Supreme Court of
Canada judgments are written is relevant. While an analysis of this
phenomenon will not shed any new light on the thought of the
judges, it will buttress some of my other assertions.

84 (1981), 124 D.L.R. (3d) 193.
85 [1979] 2 S.C.R. 435.
86 (1979), 90 D.L.R. (3d) 321.
87

Supra, note 74.

88 (1981), 125 D.L.R. (3d) 1.
89 Kettler, 'The Question of 'Legal Conservatism' in Canada" (1983) 18 3. Can. Stud.
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1. Women
The judges have not, as some might have expected,
manifested an expressly sexist bias. The approach has been both
more subtle and more consistent with the traditions of the Supreme
Court. Where women have made claims that they have been the
objects of discrimination on the basis of gender, the judges have
simply denied the existence of such discrimination.9 °
It should not be necessary here to engage in a detailed
discussion of the cases. They are, with good reason, notorious. I
will simply point out how the cases support my assertion. The cases
are A.G. Canada v. Lavell,91 Murdoch v. Murdoch,92 Bliss v, A.G.
of Canada,93 and Leatherdale v. Leatherdale.94
Lavell, to the extent that it is relevant, involved a claim by
an Indian woman that the former section 12(1)(b) of the Indian
Act95 denied her equality before the law on the basis of sex,
contrary to the Canadian Bill of Rights. Counsel for Lavell
obviously hoped to build on the Court's decision in Diybones. Just
as the Court had in that case set itself against discrimination on the
basis of race, so in this case, it was hoped, it would strike down
discrimination on the basis of gender.
Ritchie finessed this
argument. He denied that any discrimination had occurred:
The fundamental distinction between the present case and that of Drybones,
however, appears to me to be that the impugned section in the latter case could not
be enforced without denying equality of treatment in the administration and

90 This section is inspired by McDonald, "I'he Supreme Court of Canada and the
Equality Guarantee in the Charte" (1984) 2 Socialist Stud. 45.
91 [1974] S.C.R. 1349.
92 [1975] 1 S.C.R. 423.
93 [1979] 1 S.C.R. 183
94 [1982] 2 S.C.R. 743.
95 R.S.C. 1970, c. 1-6. See S.C. 1983-84-85, c. 27, s. 4.
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enforcement of the law before the ordinary courts of the land to a racial group,
whereas no such inequality of treatment flows as a necessary result of the
application of s. 12(1)(b) of the Indian Act.

In favour of the decision in Murdoch it can be said that it
galvanised the women's movement in Canada. Once again, the
judges did not manifest an express bias against women. But the
judgments of the majority do demonstrate a complete inability to
grasp the nature and meaning, or even the existence, of women's
claims to equality of treatment. The judges seemed to believe that
it was the duty of a wife to contribute her labour to the
enhancement of her husband's property. They seemed, further,
unable to grasp that a wife might have a legitimate claim against
The majority appeared to view the forced
that property.
of legal
subservience of women as arising, not from the operation
96
nature.
of
laws
the
from
but
mechanisms,
and social
Bliss is breathtaking. Section 46 of the Unemployment
Insurance Act 9 7 clearly discriminated between men and women.
Again, the majority avoided confronting this unpleasant reality by
conceptualizing the discrimination out of existence. Unemployed
pregnant women were to be treated in the same way as unemployed
pregnant men and Parliament could hardly be blamed if it happened
that all the people who went out and got themselves pregnant were
the sexes in
women. The judgment stated, "Any inequality between
98
this area is not created by legislation but by nature."
Murdoch led to the legislation governing the distribution of
family assets being changed. But Leatherdale demonstrated how
difficult it can be to move determined judges. Once again, the
judges would not recognise the work of the wife in the home as
commensurate with the work of the husband outside the home.
Once again, the majority did not manifest an expressly sexist bias,

96 One must, to be fair, refer here to Pettkus v. Becker, [1980] 2 S.C.R. 834, where a
majority was willing to find a constructive trust in favour of a common law wife. It turned out,
however, that Ms. Becker enjoyed none of the benefits of this decision. Her award was eaten
up by lawyers and, in frustration, she committed suicide.
97 S.C. 1970-71-72, c. 48.
98 Bliss, supra, note 93 at 190.
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but merely adopted an interpretation of the law which reinforced
the subordinate position of women.
2. The Police
It is here that the judges have come closest to making
express statements of social belief. The trend of the Court, at least
between 1949 and the advent of the Charter had been to offer
support to the police, at almost any cost. The judges promoted the
expansion of police powers at the expense of individual rights and
freedoms in their interpretation both of statutes and common law
99
principles.
In case after case, the Court altered the common law,
promulgated new doctrine, or misread statutes - all in order to
accede to the ostensible needs of the police. Rothman v. R.10 0 is a
striking illustration. Lamer, in allowing the admission into evidence
of information obtained through a police trick, came very close to
saying that the police should not be required to obey the law "in
dealing with shrewd and often sophisticated criminals". He did go
so far as to hold that the police should not be "hampered in their
work". In R. v. Bironf0 1 the Court radically expanded the scope of
the police power to arrest without a warrant. The Court amended
the words "finds committing" in section 450(1)(b) of the Criminal
Code10 2 to read "apparently finds committing." In the process the
judges also disregarded several hundred years of development in the
common law. Eccles v. Bourque10 3 and R. v. Stenning10 4 both dealt

99 This section draws heavily on Solomon, "Drug Enforcement Powers and the Canadian
Charterof Rights and Freedomn" (1983) 21 U.W.O.L. Rev. 219, as well as conversations with
its author.
100 (1981), 121 D.L.R. (3d) 578.
101 [1976] 2 S.C.R. 56.

102 R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34.
103 (1975), 50 D.L.R. (3d) 753.
104 [1970] S.C.R. 631.
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with police entry without a search warrant onto private premises. In
Eccles the Court held that the police could forcibly enter a dwellingplace without a warrant to search for a wanted person. In Stenning
the judges decided that the standard by which to assess police
behaviour was reasonableness, not the strict terms of the law. When
it comes to the requirements of police work, a Canadian's home is
no longer his or her castle and the legality principle can be safely
jettisoned.
Citizens in a democratic state should be free to move about
in public without police harassment. Chromniak v. R.1°s and Moore
v. R. 0 6 raise serious questions about whether this right still exists in
Canada. Chromiak blurred the distinction between being free and
being under arrest. The judges said that a person could be free, but
nonetheless subject to the authority and control of the police; not
under arrest, but denied the rights of an arrested person.107 In
Moore, the assumed common law right to remain silent in the face
of the police was swept aside to maintain their authority.
The existing powers which permit the police to legally
wiretap private conversations are, in my view, unacceptably broad for
a democratic society. In R. v. Commisso10 8 the Supreme Court of
Canada interpreted these powers so as to broaden them further.
I have only briefly surveyed some of the more egregious
decisions. It is not necessary to duplicate Tarnopolsky's meticulous
dissection of how judges rendered the procedural guarantees in the
Canadian Bill of Rights meaningless. 1 9 Grant's comment on the

[1980] 1 S.C.R. 471.
106 [1979] 1 S.C.R. 195.
107 In fairness again it must be recorded that the court rejected this approach in Therens,
[1985] 1 S.C.R. 613.
108 (1984), 36 C.R. (3d) 105.
109 See The CanadianBill of Rights, 2d ed. (Toronto, 1975) esp. at c. VII.
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Supreme Court's decision in Hogan v. R 11 0 is, however, worth
'111
repeating, "a totalitarian state could ask for little better.
What this section has attempted to demonstrate is that,
contrary to what they appear to believe about themselves, the judges
do have social beliefs and those beliefs do have an influence on the
112
way they decide cases.
3. The Style of Judgment Writing
Karl Llewellyn suggested there were two styles to be
discerned in the fashioning of appellate opinions - the Grand Style
and the Formal Style. 113 A judgment written in the Grand Style
concerns itself with the broad sweep of legal principles and social
policies. The Formal Style is analytical, leading the reader through
a logical parsing of the minutiae of legal doctrine. With the
exception of passages in some of Rand's judgments, and taking into
account a less strict attachment to it on the part of the francophone
judges, formalism has reigned in the Supreme Court of Canada.
The importance of the judges' preference for the Formal Style lies,
for present purposes, in the way the style reinforces ideological
conceptions about the judicial role. As a literary form, the Formal
Style proclaims the truth of the positivist view of judging. Judging
really is nothing more nor less than a matter of sifting through the
appropriate legal rules until the correct results reveals itself. A
judge employing the Formal Style is better able to keep hidden from
the reader, and from himself, the true nature of what he is doing.114
As Marc Gold put it, "formalism is a rhetorical style that obscures

110 [1975] 2 S.C.R. 574.
111 The Supreme Court of Canada and the Police: 1970-76" (1977-78) 20 Crim. L.Q.
152 at 161.
112 Although this methodology has been much criticised, Peck sought to make a similar

point, see 'he Supreme Court of Canada, 1958-1966: A Search for Policy Through Scalogram
Analysis" (1967) 45 Can. Bar Rev. 666.
113 See The Common Law Tradition: DecidingAppeals (Boston: Little, Brown, 1960).

114 See, for example, Stark, "Why Lawyers Can't Write" (1984) 97 Harv. L. Rev. 1389.
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the true basis of a court's decision while
enabling the court to
1 15
appear as if it were acting impartially....
The Formal Style has been the style of opinion-writing in the
Supreme Court of Canada 1 16 This is, surely, not fortuitous. The
determinedly obfuscating way Supreme Court judgments are written
is consonant with the ideological imperatives which inform the
court's work. The Formal Style gives the appearance of confirming
judicial neutrality.
The Formal Style is fitting for a judiciary which agrees with
the dominant ideology1 17 Formalism is a comfortable style for
judges who are satisfied with existing social relations.
4. The Charter
It is beyond argument that there has been a substantial
formal change in the judicial function since the adoption of the
Charter. We have moved from a political system based on
parliamentary supremacy to one based on constitutional
supremacy.1 18 Practically speaking, this means that the grounds
upon which judges may review both legislative and executive acts has
been broadened. The judges have become,
as Dickson put it in one
119
case, the "guardians of the constitution."
But has the social role of the judges been changed? More
precisely, has there been a change in the ideological responsibilities
115 Marc Gold, 'qhe Mask of Objectivity: Politics and Rhetoric in the Supreme Court
of Canada" (1985) 7 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. 455.

116 On the origins of formalism in the Canadian legal system, see the magisterial article,
Blaine Baker, 'The Reconstitution of Upper Canadian Legal Through in the Late-Victorian
Empire" (1985) 3 Law & Hist. Rev. 219.

117 See Elizabeth Fox-Genovese & Eugene D. Genovese, "Jurisprudence and Property
Relations in Bourgeois and Slave Society' in Fruits ofMerchant Capital: Slavery and Bourgeois
Property in the Rise and Expansion of Capitalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983)

at c. XII.
118 The textual basis for this change is s. 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982. See the
interesting analysis in Del Buono, 'The Implications of the Supreme Court's Purpose
Interpretation of the Charter" (1986) 48 C.R. (3d) 121.
119 Hunter v. Southam Inc., [1984] 2 S.C.R. 144 at 169.
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of the judges or in the ideology with which they surround these
responsibilities? The answer is are a resounding no.
The clear objective tendency of Charter cases has been in
favour of the dominant class. The major beneficiaries of Charter
litigation have been corporations. Corporations have been granted
the standing to bring Charteractions before the courts. Their claims
to the rights set out in the Charter have been upheld. The result
has been that the judges have enabled corporations to use the
1 20
Charter to successfully challenge various forms of state regulation.
And while the courts have been willing to permit
corporations to enjoy the rights set out in the Charter, it has been
held that those same rights do not apply as against corporations,
that they impose no restrictions on the freedom of action of
corporations. Thus, corporations get all the benefits, but none of
12 1
the burdens, of the Charter
It is consistent with this tendency that trade unions have
been major losers in Charterlitigation. The "freedom of association"
in section 2(d) of the Charter has been interpreted by the Supreme
Court to be simply that: a freedom to associate, but no more.
Workers may form trade unions and belong to them. But trade
unions have no constitutional rights to bargain collectively or to
12 2
strike.
The truly amazing thing is the judges continue to act as if
nothing had happened. Although they openly accept that they are
now playing an expanded and explicit role in formulating social
policy,1 23 their commitment to the notion of judicial neutrality
remains unchanged. They are simply, as McIntyre put it, "neutral

120 Ibid. Also see R. v. Big M. Drug Mart Ltd., [19851 1 S.C.R. 295. See Petter, "Ihe
Politics of the Charter" (1986) 8 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. 473.
121 RetailHIzolesale and Department Store Union v. Dolphin Delivery Ltd, [1986] 2 S.C.R.

573.
122 Government of Saskatchewan v. RW.D.S.U. [unreported]; P.S.A.C. v. A.G. Manitoba,
[unreported]; Reference rePublic Service Employee RegulationsAct (9 April 1987), [unreported].

123 Dickson, "Address to the Canadian Bar Association" (Toronto, 5 February 1985) as
quoted in Sussel & Manley-Casimir, 'The Supreme Court of Canada as a 'National School
Board': The Charter and Education Change" (1986) 11 Can. 3. Ed. 313 at 318.
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arbiters".1 24 The only thing that has changed, albeit slightly, is the
way in which they now express that commitment.
Just as previously the judges had portrayed themselves as the
passive means through which the law expressed itself, they now
claim they are simply implementing the dictates of the Constitution.
To the outside observer the judges have used the Charter to justify
the almost whimsical imposition of their own values and priorities on
Canadian society. But the judges themselves blithely deny it.
The decisions in Reference re Section 94(2) of the [B.C.]
Motor Vehicle Act/ 25 especially that of Lamer, illustrate the current
approach. The section created an absolute liability offence of
driving while prohibited or while one's licence was suspended. An
individual could be convicted even though he or she had not been
aware of the prohibition or suspension. The minimum punishment
for this offence was seven days imprisonment. The question before
the Supreme Court was whether this provision violated the
guarantee of "life, liberty and security of the person and the right
not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with principles of
fundamental justice" in section 7 of the Charter.
The judges struck the B.C. law down. In so doing they
clearly gave themselves the authority to invalidate laws that
conflicted with their notions of right and wrong, but denied that this
was what they were doing. Lamer gave it all away in the first
sentence of his judgment: "A law that has the potential to convict a
person who has not really done anything wrong offends the
principles of fundamental justice.... "126
What exactly are the "principles of fundamental justice?"
Lamer was not sure. But that really did not matter, for, "the
principles of fundamental justice are to be found in the basic tenets
of our legal system. They do not lie in the realm of general public

124 Supra, note 119 at 600.
125 (1985), 24 D.L.R. (4th) 536.
126 Ibid. at 541.
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policy but in the
inherent domain of the judiciary as guardian of the
1 27
system."
justice
Was not Lamer merely substituting his own personal social
preferences for those of the B.C. legislature? Of course not.
"Content of legislation has always been considered in constitutional
adjudication".128 But that did not mean the courts could resolve
issues of public policy. "In neither case, be it before or after the
the
Chatete, have the courts been enabled to decide upon
1 29
appropriateness of policies underlying legislative enactments".
A further illustration can be found in R. v. Oakes.13° In this
case the court formulated the approach to be taken in applying
section 1 of the Charter Before looking at what the court did, it
must be understood that determination of whether a limit on a
guaranteed right is "justified in a free and democratic society" is
inherently and inescapably political. But the approach set out by
Dickson substantially obscures this. By couching a social value
judgment in obfuscating language, Dickson made it appear that the
judges, once again, were merely carrying out a technical function.
Dickson stated that a court must first look to the objective
sought to be achieved through the limit on a Charterright. Is it "of
sufficient importance to warrant overriding a constitutionally
protected right or freedom"? How does a court decide that an
objective is "sufficiently important"? The objective must "relate to
concerns which are pressing and substantial in a free and democratic
society". Which concerns are "pressing and substantial"? We are
not told.
If the objective passes muster, then the court looks to the
means adopted to achieve the objective. The court must decide
whether the means are "proportionate" to the objective. The words
used by Dickson lend an air of scientific detachment to the

127 Ibid. at 550.
128 Ibid. at 544.
129 Ibid.

130 [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103.
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exercise.1 31 The approach set out has come to be called the "Oakes
test" by lawyers and judges, the word test confirming its success as
ideology.
Wilson has decided to take a different approach. She no
longer claims to be merely the conduit through which the
Constitution expresses itself. She has expressly stated the social
objectives which direct her decisions and then proceeded to give
effect to them.
Wilson's approach is a profound departure from the received
ideology of judging in Canada. It is set out in her decision in
Morgentalerv. R.13 2 This was the case in which the Supreme Court
of Canada assessed the constitutionality of the abortion provisions
in the Ciminal Code. As they had done in earlier cases,1 33 the
judges, other than Wilson, denied they were passing judgment on
abortion. As McIntyre put it,
the task of the court in this case is not to solve, nor seek to solve what might be
called the abortion
issue, but simply to measure the content of section 251 against
13 4
the Charter.

Again, the judges are performing a purely technical, neutral
function.
But not Wilson. She claimed to find in the Charter both a
philosophy and a programme for the ordering of society. The
Charter defined the proper relationship between the state and the
individual and in so doing "erect(ed) around each individual,
metaphorically speaking, an invisible fence over which the state will
not be allowed to trespass". 35 She is thus able to discern that the
Charter guarantees "the right to make fundamental personal

131 Ibid. at 138-140.
132 (1988), 44 D.L.R. (4th) 385.
133 Supra, notes 73, 74.

134 Supra, note 131 at 465.
135 Ibid. at 485.
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decisions without interference from the state",13 6 even though there
is no reference whatsoever to this principle in the text of the
Charter. From this point Wilson need take only a short step in
order to recognise a general right to privacy, to a constitutionallybased guarantee of individual autonomy. The point is not whether
Wilson is "right" or "wrong". It is that she has eschewed the
principle of judicial neutrality. She has openly declared her
allegiance to a libertarian social philosophy and, more important, to
implementing that philosophy in her judging.
Not only does the ideology continue to baffle the judges; it
seems to retain its hold on the minds of many academic
commentators. Although it is by no means unique, a recent article
by F.L. Morton, "The Political Impact of the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms"/3 7 is a good example. Morton applauds the
energetic approach the Supreme Court has taken to Charter cases:
The impact of the Charteron judicial behaviour has been dramatic. Both in their
words and in their deeds, Canadian judges have begun to carve out a bold new

constitutional jurisprudence.

138

He notes the impressive success rate achieved by litigants
who rely on the Charter, especially in the Supreme Court. He
reviews some of the major decisions, but nowhere seeks to analyze
the social, which is to say, class, interests involved in them. More
important, there is no discussion of the judges themselves, no
attempt to suggest why they decided cases in the ways they did.
Morton concludes his essay by arguing that in Canada we now have
"constitutional supremacy", not "judicial supremacy." The implication
is that we continue to have socially neutral judges who are doing
nothing more than attempting to ensure that the Constitution is
obeyed.
From the 1880s until 1937 the Supreme Court of the U.S.
was in the vanguard of reaction. The judges claimed to be
upholding the Constitution; in fact they were striking down laws

136 Ibid. at 486.
137 (1987) 20 Can. J.Pol. Sci. 31.
138 Ibid. at 34.
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which made even minimal concessions to working class political
demands. 1 39 There are hints in some of the cases that our courts
may be entering a similar phase. The ideology about judging
seriously inhibits our ability to perceive this.
IV. CONCLUSION
The law is, amongst other things, a major element in the
The central
development and maintenance of ideology.140
ideological precept of the Canadian legal system is the notion of
equality. All citizens are formal equals in the eyes of the law. The
administration of justice must, as a necessary corollary to this
precept, be perceived as neutral. The judge must be seen as
dispassionately applying the law, and nothing but the law. Were
judges to be seen to be enforcing their own ideas or beliefs - their
own social priorities - the ideology would be revealed as ... ideology.
The peculiar ideological conditions which exist in Canada, then,
dictate the approach taken by the judges of the Supreme Court of
Canada. Of course the judges do have positions on social issues,
but the ideology of the legal system demands that they strive to
behave as if they did not.
The judges belong to a social class - the dominant class in
Canadian society. They contribute to the dominance of that class by
behaving on the bench as if they were socially neutral. They thus
play their peculiar class role by acting so as to deny the very
existence of class.

139 See Martin, 'The Judges and the Charter"(1984) 2 Socialist Stud. 66.

140 Some useful writings in addition to Hunt, supra, note 8 are Douglas Hay et at,
Albion's Fatal Tree: Crime and Society in Eighteenti Century England (London: Allan Lane,
1975); E.P. Thompson, Whigs andHunters: The Origin of the Black Act, supra, note 9; Eugene
D. Genovese, Ro/4 Jordan,Roll: The World the Slaves Made (New York: Vintage Books, 1976);
Colin Sumner, Reading Ideologies:An Investigation into the Marxist Theory of Ideology and Law

(London: Academic Press, 1979); and Hugh Collins, Marxin

and Law (Oxford: 1984).

